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 The  European  Union,  and  indeed  the 
entire world, has reached a major historical 
crossroads —  not  dissimilar  in  scale  to 
1648,  1815  or  1945.  We  are  entering  a 
complex  period  of  power  transition, 
triggered simultaneously by the end of the 
Cold  War  and  by  globalization.  These 
processes  reflect  powerful  movements  of 
history’s  tectonic  plates.  The  challenges 
they have thrown up are like nothing the 
world has seen before. As Einstein noted, 
“We  can’t  solve  problems  by  using  the 
same kind of thinking we used in creating 
them”. A new approach, a new mindset is 
required to move forward. We know that 
the  EU  was  founded  to  solve  yesterday’s 
problem — the one thousand year old civil 
war  within  and  between  Europe’s 
barbarous member states. That narrative of 
internal  peace  no  longer  resonates  with 
today’s  generation  of  twenty-somethings 
who will run the Union in 20 years’ time. 
There has to be a new type of motivation. 
We  are  in  desperate  need  of  a  new 
narrative. In Athens on 8 July, Catherine 
Ashton  was  upbeat  about  the  progress 
which Lisbon induces, at the same time as 
she  acknowledged  that  we  are  still  in  a 
“transition  phase”.
1  But  Lisbon  does  not 
amount to a new narrative. 
I  don’t  have  all  the  answers.  As  Oscar 
Wilde quipped, “I am not young enough to 
know  everything…”.  But  of  this  I  am 
certain. If the EU fails to capitalize on the 
promise  of  Lisbon  including,  crucially, 
Permanent  Structured  Cooperation  in 
Defence  (PSCD),  if  the  member  states 
continue  to  fiddle  while  Brussels  burns, 
                                                 
1  http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=SPEECH/10/378&format=PDF&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=nl.  
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then  the  whole  intricate  tapestry  woven 
over  the  last  fifty  odd  years  could  well 
begin to unravel. Einstein defined insanity 
as  “doing  the  same  thing  over  and  over 
again and expecting different results”. How 
long will it take us to recognise that, if the 
prime motive force behind the European 
story  is  narrow  member  state  national 
interest, then the Union as a global actor will 
remain  merely  a  figment  of  the  political 
imagination, a revolutionary new Broadway 
show  for  which  there  were  many 
rehearsals,  props  and  a  script  but  which 
simply  failed  to  open.  The  recent  Greek 
crisis demonstrated that the member states 
ultimately understand that, in the words of 
Benjamin  Franklin,  they  must  hang 
together  in  order  to  avoid  hanging 
separately. But it took them an awful long 
time  to  demonstrate  that  collective 
understanding.  And  the  financial  markets 
remain  largely  unimpressed.  Andrew 
Moravcsik recently argued in Newsweek that 
the  EU  enjoys  a  blissful  state  of  stable 
equilibrium  which  rules  out  with  equal 
certainty either a collapse of the Eurozone 
or  a  great  leap  forward  towards  much 
deeper  integration.  I  am  far  from 
convinced by this thesis… The EU needs 
to  go  boldly  forward  on  both  fronts:  its 
own  internal  functioning  and  its  role  on 
the global stage. 
Churchill  said  that  “a  pessimist  sees  the 
difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist 
sees  the  opportunity  in  every  difficulty”. 
As you may recall, Churchill also said, “as 
for me, I am an optimist. I frankly see little 
point in being anything else”. Many of us 
European  scholars  and  practitioners  are 
life-long  optimists,  who  have  believed 
strongly in the historical importance of the 
European  integration  story.  Recently,  I 
think many of us have felt our optimism 
ebbing  away.  Yes,  we  expected  turf  wars 
after Lisbon was ratified; yes, it is normal 
that  such  a  significant  institutional 
innovation as the External Action Service 
would  take  time  to  bed  down;  yes,  we 
knew that the post of High Representative 
and  that  of  Presidency  of  the  Council 
would have to co-exist with powerful egos 
in  the  national  capitals  and  in  the 
Charlemagne  building.  All  this,  we 
expected.  What  we  did  not  expect  was 
such a protracted and small-minded type of 
guerrilla warfare over the tiniest details of 
competence and responsibility. This must 
be avoided at all cost when implementing 
PSCD. 
Let me be clear. I consider the EU to be an 
amazing success story, the most incredible 
experiment in international relations since 
the  Roman  Empire —  and  infinitely  less 
bloody. For more than fifty years, we have 
muddled along, accumulating an acquis and 
creating a praxis which has brought us to 
the verge of international actorness. But the 
curtain has not yet gone up and the show 
has  not  yet  really  begun.  Much  of  the 
progress  towards  actorness  is  attributable 
to  the  sheer  determination  and 
commitment of the founding fathers and 
their waves of successors. There have been 
as  many  failures  as  successes.  And,  to 
quote  Churchill  once  again,  “success 
consists  in  going  from  failure  to  failure 
without  loss  of  enthusiasm”.  But  is  that 
enthusiasm still there today? Where is the 
new narrative?  
A MILITARY ACTOR 
 
One important part of the new narrative is 
that the EU has become a military actor — 
but of a new and different type. Brussels 
does not do classical warfare, but it does 
do international crisis management — and 
it will have to do much more of it in the 
future. The number of fragile and failing 
states is not decreasing. The member states 
have something called “defence budgets”, 
but “defence” as traditionally understood is 
only a small part of what the EU is about 
militarily.  In  fact,  collective  defence  
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remains,  in  all  official  discourse,  the 
responsibility  of  NATO.  The  EU-27,  in 
2008,  nevertheless  spent  almost  US$300 
billion on “defence”, less than half the US 
defence  budget  for  that  year — $ 6 9 6  
billion. But the EU includes eight of the 
top twenty national defence budgets in the 
world, and currently contains the world’s 
number  two  and  three  spenders  (France 
and the UK). The collective EU spend is 
equivalent to the combined defence budgets 
of the eight next biggest defence spenders 
(China, Japan, Russia, Saudi-Arabia, India, 
Brazil,  South  Korea  and  Australia — 
$289,108),  which  include  all  the  “rising 
powers”.  
And yet, the EU gets very little bang for its 
euros.  Out  of  that  colossal  overall 
“defence”  outlay,  the  EU-27  has  been 
attempting  to  fund  twenty-seven  separate 
armies,  twenty-three  air-forces  and 
nineteen  navies.  Furthermore,  just  three 
countries  in  the  EU  (France,  the  UK  and 
Germany) together account for over 60% 
of  the  combined  EU-27  defence  budgets 
and if Italy is added to the trio, the four 
nations alone contribute over 70% of the 
total  EU  defence  expenditure.  The  only 
one of the new accession states with any 
significant military clout is Poland, which 
has doubled its defence budget in the past 
five  years  and  ranks  (at  $10,176  m)  in 
seventh  place  out  of  the  EU-27.  The 
average  “defence”  expenditure  of  the 
fifteen lowest-spending EU member states 
(who collectively account for 7.7% of the 
“EU  budget”)  comes  to  just  $1,495  m. 
That  is  half  the  defence  budget  of 
Vietnam! In the view of one leading expert, 
Nick Witney, much of the money the EU 
spends  each  year  on  defence  “is  simply 
wasted”. Given the current crisis, there is 
no  money  to  waste.  The  case  for 
rationalisation  is  overwhelming  and  long 
overdue. PSCD will play an important part 
in that process. 
As Belgium, Hungary and Poland prepare 
to  take  their  turns  at  the  tiller,  the 
challenges  are  going  to  become  tougher 
and  tougher.  Every  analyst  agrees  that 
international crisis management is a crucial 
added value which the EU is well placed to 
deliver. But they also agree that the coming 
missions  will  be  much  more  complex. 
Atalanta  is  probably  the  most  serious 
military  mission  yet  undertaken —  it  is 
certainly the most overtly strategic mission 
the  EU  has  undertaken.  But  for  every 
Atalanta, there are ten or a dozen potential 
missions in Darfur, Gaza, Lebanon/Syria, 
the Caucasus, the Mediterranean waiting in 
the  wings.  The  EU  is  currently  receiving 
far more requests for its crisis management 
skills than it can possibly meet. It simply 
cannot  escape  its  international 
responsibility as a military actor. The record 
to date is nothing to be ashamed of. Every 
operation  so  far  undertaken  has  its 
underlying  raison  d’être.  None  has  been 
embarked on flippantly or for the wrong 
reasons. But the future will be much more 
challenging.  And  this  is  where  PSCD  is 
both  a  symbol  and  an  example.  It  is  a 
symbol  of  political  will  in  the  service  of 
effective  military  inputs.  And  it  is  an 
example  of  the  method  the  EU  must 
deploy if it is to meet its strategic objective 
of  helping  to  forge  a  more  stable,  more 
balanced, more cohesive world order. 
Bottom  up  coordination  is  unavoidable. 
Member  states  with  similar  levels  of 
capacity will have to talk to one another to 
arrive at sensible synergies. But top down 
is  equally  unavoidable.  Some  of  us  have 
been  arguing  for  years  in  favour  of  a 
European  Security  Council,  a  formal 
Council of Defence Ministers, a European 
White Book on Security and Defence, an 
integrated  Intelligence  Agency,  a 
permanent OHQ, an upgraded EDA, the 
type  of  coordinated  defence  capacity 
generation  projects  which  we  saw  under 
the French Presidency in 2008 and much  
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more  besides.  Without  these  stimuli, 
Europe will remain a lesser military actor 
than she needs to be. And in the context of 
the  emerging  world  order,  she  cannot 
afford not to be a serious actor.  
EU STRENGTHS 
 
What  are  the  EU’s  strengths  and 
weaknesses  as  a  global  actor?  At  a 
predominantly  material  level,  the  EU  has 
many  serious  disadvantages,  both  in 
relation to the US and in relation to the 
emerging  powers:  geographic  size; 
demographic  decline;  resource  penury; 
energy dependency; colonial baggage (let’s 
not  kid  ourselves,  those  formerly  on  the 
receiving end of imperial outreach are not 
uniformly  positive  about  the  European 
legacy); we also suffer from sluggish if not 
zero  growth.  The  list  is  long.  And  when 
one adds to it the absence of any central 
political  authority,  the  whole  EU  project 
begins to look like an elaborate hoax. What 
are  the  EU’s  strong  points  as  an 
international actor? There are several, and 
they are really important, and they all relate 
to  the  context  in  which  international 
relations is set to take place over the next 
few decades. For here, the EU does have a 
comparative advantage — if only it would 
learn to leverage it. 
First, the world has now enjoyed sixty-five 
years  of  multilateral  institutionalism  and 
the progressive accumulation of a corpus 
of  international  law  which  has  sought — 
with  marked  success —  to  regulate 
relations  between  states  existing  under 
anarchy.  The  EU  has  blazed  that  trail  as 
effectively as (if not more effectively than) 
any other actor.  
Second, we have an intensifying system of 
what  Joe  Nye  and  Bob  Keohane  have 
called  “complex  interdependence”:  the 
thickly  woven,  deeply  intermeshed  and 
structurally inter-related global networks of 
investments,  exchanges,  flows  of  every 
conceivable type — and even interests — 
between nation states and other actors. In 
many  ways,  in  terms  of  forging  and 
managing  complex  interdependence,  the 
EU is in a class of its own. 
Third, the bloody violence of war in the 
20
th century demonstrates conclusively that 
territorial aggrandisement no longer pays. 
And the recent wars in Vietnam, Iraq and 
Afghanistan  have  shown  that  military 
power  alone  has  very  little  utility  when  it 
comes  to  solving  complex  socio-political 
problems. Thomas Barnett has warned of 
the pointlessness, in the 21
st century world, 
of deploying naked military might — what 
he calls the “Leviathan Force” — without 
having  in  advance  fully  thought  through 
what  happens  next.  The  EU  understood 
this dilemma earlier and better than most 
other players. The EU as a military actor 
has  trail-blazed  integration  of  military 
instruments and “everything that happens 
next”. In many ways, it is because the EU 
is  emerging  as  a  military  power  that  it  is 
beginning  to  be  effective  as  a  civilian 
power.  
Fourth, the “international community” has 
arrived at a historical turning point where 
failed states have become more worrisome 
than strong states, where collective security 
becomes  more  relevant  than  territorial 
defence,  where  human  rights  become  as 
important  as  states’  rights,  and  where 
multi-level  bargaining  trumps  muscle-
flexing.  Once  again,  in  this  radically  new 
approach  to  IR,  the  EU  has  blazed  an 
often  lonely  trail.  The  EU  recognized 
before any other major player that, in this 
complex  multi-polar  world,  every 
problem — and every solution — is in fact 
political. 
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GRAND STRATEGY 
 
But  in  order  to  deliver  on  the  serious 
potential  which  it  commands  in  the  21
st 
century,  the  EU  needs  strategic  vision. 
Some of us have been banging on for years 
about  the  need  for  a  “grand  strategy”. 
There are four main reasons why the EU 
needs to begin at long last to think in terms 
of  “the  calculated  relationship  between 
means and large ends”.  
First, the very fact (highlighted earlier) that 
the EU, politically and institutionally, does 
not enjoy the attributes of a unitary state 
should motivate its leaders urgently to find 
ways  of  overcoming  what  is  a  major 
strategic disadvantage.  
The second reason is that the US umbilical 
cord  has  now  been  cut.  The  glaring 
contradictions  in  the  Albright  Report  on 
NATO’s  new  strategic  concept  are  a 
reminder that while Europeans still yearn 
for  Article  5,  Americans  want  European 
support  for  their  global  grand  strategy.  I 
fail to see how NATO, which at the same 
time needs desperately to tighten its belt, 
can deliver both. In Europe and in the rest 
of the world, Europeans increasingly need 
to  be  clear  about  what  it  is  they  are 
attempting to achieve. The formulation of 
European  strategic  objectives  should 
follow European logic and European logic 
alone. We need a new yardstick — what I 
shall call the Shapiro and Witney litmus test
2 — 
to  enable  us  to  measure  the  extent  to 
which the EU is capable of defining its own 
autonomous  policy  with  regard  to  the  great 
strategic challenges of the coming decades. 
It  is  only  when  the  EU  emerges  as  an 
                                                 
2 Nick Witney & Jeremy Shapiro, Towards a Post-
American  Europe:  A  Power  Audit  of  EU-US 
Relations. London, European Council on Foreign 
Relations,  2009,  http://ecfr.eu/page/-
/documents/towards-a-post-american-europe.pdf.  
autonomous actor that the US will value it as 
an ally. 
The  third  reason  has  to  do  with  a  new 
approach  to  partnerships  with  the  other 
major players. The EU is objectively well 
placed  to  engage  in  such  new  strategic 
partnerships.  This  was  the  third  priority 
mentioned  by  Catherine  Ashton  in  her 
Athens  speech.  However,  unless  these 
partnerships  are  coordinated  via  a  grand 
strategic plan, they will be sub-optimal in 
impact.  
The final reason derives directly from this 
last  point:  the  world’s  other  principal 
players,  all  of  which  are  unitary  states, 
behave  in  a  clear  strategic  way.  The  US, 
China,  Russia,  India  and  Brazil  are 
pursuing clear-cut and long-term strategic 
goals. General Jo Coelmont was the first to 
suggest that they are playing chess while the 
EU is playing ping-pong. But chess is zero-
sum:  one  winner,  one  loser.  We  don’t 
believe  in  that  any  more.  I  sometimes 
suspect that we are actually engaged in a 
collective game of Go. In Go, “victory” is 
relative. There are no absolute losers. We 
really  need  to  think  in  terms  of  a  brand 
new game, a positive sum game in which 
everybody is a winner. This must be the new 
narrative.  The  type  of  game  now  being 
engaged by the major players is not of the 
traditional Westphalian type, dominated by 
military power and territorial acquisition. It 
is a game which involves the deployment 
of a vast range of instruments (including 
military  instruments)  in  new  and 
unprecedented  ways —  a  game,  in  short, 
for  which  the  EU  is  comparatively  well 
equipped. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Catherine Ashton spoke of the EU’s need 
to be both “generous” and “creative” in its 
interaction  with  its  strategic  partners.  I 
could not agree more. What is required is 
what  Robert  Hutchings  has  called  the 
global  grand  bargain.  The  global  grand 
bargain  will  involve  a  necessary  series  of 
trade-offs,  some  bilateral,  some 
multilateral,  between  the  rising  and  the 
declining powers. These trade-offs will be 
required  in  all  major  policy  areas — 
governance,  security,  finance,  trade, 
agriculture,  energy,  climate,  development, 
proliferation,  cultural  exchanges  and 
intellectual  property.  The  Global  Grand 
Bargain will, in effect, lead to the creation 
of a brand new international system. This is 
the  new  grand  narrative.  The  rising  powers 
have made it quite clear that they will not 
just  be  co-opted  into  the  existing  liberal 
international  order.  What  the  new  grand 
narrative  should  aim  for  is  a  world  of 
cultural  and  political  diversity  in  which, 
nevertheless,  stability,  security,  prosperity, 
development, environmental sustainability, 
and  self-determination  are  considered  in 
holistic  terms  as  key  elements  of  global 
inter-dependence. The creation of this new 
international order, equally acceptable to all 
players (including the Global South) is the 
great challenge of the coming decades.  
The  creation  of  the  EU  was  a  visionary 
attempt to adapt to the new international 
order  of  the  post-1945  world.  Further 
adaptation  to  the  very  different  world 
order  emerging  in  the  21st  century 
demands  equally  far-sighted  strategic 
vision.  It  demands  a  Global  Grand 
Bargain.  That  is  the  narrative  able  to 
enthuse and motivate the new generations 
of Europeans. To help strike that bargain, 
the  EU  urgently  needs  to  maximise  its 
military  potential.  PSCD  is  an  excellent 
place to start. 
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